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Abstract
Two dynamic sticky price models with monopolistic competition in the goods market are
presented. In the first model, each intermediate goods producer faces quadratic costs of
adjusting its nominal price as introduced by Rotemberg (1982); the second model incorporates
staggered price setting as proposed by Taylor (1980) and recently discussed by
Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan (2000). Using the approximation method and the toolkit of Uhlig
(1999) these models are used to derive theoretical impulse response functions. One aim is to
check whether these two different forms of nominal price rigidities imply quantitatively and
qualitatively different impulse response functions. Interestingly, both models do not seem to
imply as much persistence as empirical impulse response functions typically indicate.
However, qualitative differences do exist.
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2Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a
Monetary Shock1
1 Introduction
Of crucial importance for both the analysis of monetary policy and the study of the business
cycle is the concept of the monetary transmission process. Recent econometric work based on
VAR models suggests that monetary policy shocks do have real effects that last for many
quarters (see the summaries in e.g. Christiano/Eichenbaum/Evans, 1999 or Favero, 2001).
One important feature of the evidence is the persistent movement in output (and other
variables) after a monetary shock, that is, aggregate output seems to display an inverse j-
shaped response ("hump-shaped") and a zero long-run effect after a expansionary monetary
shock.
Still a matter of debate are the mechanisms through which monetary shocks affect real
economic activity. However, one popular explanation for non-neutrality is to emphasize
nominal rigidities, i.e. sluggish adjustment of goods prices or money wages (or both).
Nominal rigidities are of potential interest because they imply that nominal shocks can be
transmitted by the propagation mechanisms of the model economy. An unattractive way of
generating persistence is to simply assume that prices or wages are fixed for a long period of
time. A more appealing way is to consider small frictions that lead to endogenous price or
wage rigidities and therefore to persistent movement of output.
A number of recent papers have incorporated nominal rigidities in dynamic general
equilibrium models. The specific source of the nominal rigidities range from a setting in
which prices or wages are set in advance for one or more periods (e.g. Cho, 1993) to models
where the adjustement prices incur some costs (e.g. Hairault/Portier, 1993) or to models
where only a fraction of firms have the possibility to change their prices. (e.g. Yun, 1996).
These models generate real effects of monetary shocks, but they rarely explain the persistence.
It still seems, that the real effects in the data tend to have a longer life than is reasonable to
assume for the types of rigidities imposed in the models (Bergin/Feenstra, 2000).
Taylor (1980) already referred to the problem of persistence in models with nominal
rigidities.2 However, he showed that a rational expectational model, in which wage contracts
                                                
1 I am grateful to Ingo Barens for many helpful comments.
3were the only source of rigidity, was capable of endogenously generating persistence,
significantly outlasting the duration of the contract period. Two assumptions underlie this
result: (1) wage contracts are staggered, that is, not all wage decisions in the economy are
made at the same time; (2) when making wage decisions, firms (and unions) take into account
the wage rates which are set by other firms. In effect, because of the staggering, each contract
is written relative to other contracts, and this causes shocks to be passed on from one contract
to another. Blanchard (1983) applied the idea of staggering to firms setting their prices in an
asynchronized fashion and showed that the results also hold when firms set prices in a
staggered fashion. Recently however, Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan (2000) have questioned the
potential of the staggered price setting to generate endogenous persistence. They demonstrate
that staggering of price changes alone does not generate endogenous persistence in a dynamic
general equilibrium model.
As the considered nominal rigidities do not produce persistent real effects, one might be
inclined to conclude that the specific sources of rigidities imply similar dynamics. This seems
to be the perception in the literature (for instance Roberts, 1995, Jeanne, 1998, Mankiw,
2001). However, this view has recently been questioned. Recent work shows that nominal
price rigidity and nominal wage rigidity do differ in their potential of producing persistence
(see e.g. Huang/Liu (1999). Using an analytical approach, Kiley (1998) concludes that
different forms of nominal price inertia imply different dynamics, at least for typical
parameteriziations of dynamic general equlibrium models.
The present paper is in the spirit of Kiley (1998). It illustrates that although two types of
nominal price rigidities do not generate persistence of the aggregate output they imply
different dynamics. To do so, a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with capital
accumulation and monopolistic competition in the goods market is formulated. Two model
variations are discussed by introducing two specific sources of nominal price inertia. In the
first variant each intermediate goods producer faces quadratic costs of adjusting its nominal
price as introduced by Rotemberg (1982); the second variant incorporates staggered price
setting. The following can be concluded. Simulated impulse response functions show that
adjustment costs do not generate persistent output movements, even if the adjustment costs
are increased to an unrealistic magnitude. Furthermore, staggered price setting as an
alternative source of nominal price inertia can lead to impulse response functions that
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Another early paper is Fischer (1979a).
4oscillate. This confirms the analytical results of Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan (2000). Obviously,
the simulation results are at odds with the empirical evidence However, the results indicate
that different forms of nominal price inertia can imply qualitatively different dynamics. It
might be concluded that the formulation of a standard quantitative general equilibrium model
is unsufficient because of the lack of a powerful transmission mechanism.
2 Monopolistic competition and adjustment costs
The economic environment
The specification of the model is based on the business cycle literature. The model
formulation takes its principle features from Ireland (1997) who builds on earlier work by
Blanchard/Kiyotaki (1987) and Hairault/Portier (1993). The specification of nominal price
inertia is based on Rotemberg (1982). The economy is populated by a representative
household, a representative firm, which produces the finished goods, a continuum of
intermediate goods producing firms and a monetary authority. The representative household
has preferences over consumption, leisure and real money balances. The household purchases
consumption and investment goods from the finished goods producing firm and receives
income from its labour and from ist capital supply to the intermediate goods producing firms
in competitive markets. The final goods producers behave competitively. In each period t they
choose inputs produced by the intermediate goods producers and produce output to maximize
profits. The intermediate goods producing firms, indexed by [ ]1,0∈i , each produce a distinct
intermediate good with labor and capital supplied by the representative household. Since
intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another, the intermediate goods producing
firms sell their output in a monopolistically competitive market. Each intermediate good
producer faces a quadratic cost of adjusting its nominal output price. The nominal money
supply follows an exogenous stochastic process.
Description of the representative household
The representative household has preferences defined over consumption of the finished good,
leisure, and real cash balance. It chooses an optimal quatriple of consumption, leisure, real
balances and capital subject to a budget constraint. The preferences are described by the
expected utility function
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with β as a constant discount factor, 10 << β . tc  is consumption of the final good, tl  is
leisure and ttt PMm ≡  is real cash balances, tP  is the price level and tM  is money. The
household carries 1−tM  units of money and 
H
tk 1−  units of capital into period t (where "
H"
denotes the household variables). During period t, it supplies )(in Ht  units of labour at the real
wage tw  and consumes tl  units of leisure. Total available time is normalized to one, i.e.
1=+ t
H
t ln . The supply of labour must satisfy ∫= 1
0
)( diinn Htt . The household accumulates the
physical capital of the economy which is supplied at the real rental rate tr  to each intermediate
goods producing firm. The household choices must satisfy ∫ −− = 1
0
11 )( diikk
H
tt . The capital
accumulation constraint is standard and given by
( ) tHtHt Ikk +−= −11 δ ,
where tI  denotes investment and δ  denotes the capital depreciation rate, 10 ≤≤ δ .
In addition to the factor payment the household receives a lump-sum transfer tτ  and the
dividends tΠ  from the intermediate goods producers, where ∫Π=Π 1
0
)( diitt .
The budget constraint can be written as
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Description of the firms
The representative finished goods producing firm uses )(iyt  units of each intermediate good i
during period t to produce ty  units of the finished goods. The technology of the finished
goods producer is described by the following constant returns to scale production technology
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where 1>θ . The elasticity of substitution is equal to θ− .
In each period t, the intermediate goods producing firm i hires )(inUt  units of labour and
)(1 ik
U
t−  units of capital from the representative household to produce )(iyt  units of output
according to a constant returns to scale technology ( )tUtUtst zinikfiy ),(),()( 1−=  (where "U"
denotes the firm variables). The analysis will be based on a Cobb-Douglas production
function of the form
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The technology shock tz  is described by a stationary process
( ) zttzzt zzz εψψ ++−= −1loglog1log . (6.)
where ( )ε σt i i d N~ . . . ,0 2  and 10 << zψ .
Deriving the optimal plans for the representative houshold and the firms
The optimization problem of the representative household is to maximimize
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The first order conditions for this problem can be denoted as
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Every period t, the finished goods producer chooses )(iyt  units to maximize its profits
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where tP  is the nominal price of the finished good and )(iPt  is the nominal price of the
intermediate good i. The first order condition results in the demand function for intermediate
good i as a function of its output ty  and the relative price tt PiP )( :
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As the finished goods producer operates under perfect competition, it earns zero profits in
equilibrium. The zero-profit condition can be used to determine the price-level as
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Each intermediate goods producing firm sells its output in a monopolistically competitive
market and faces a quadratic cost function when adjusting its nominal price. The functional
form of the cost function is expressed as
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Unlike some menu-costs which are unchanged for each price change, equation (16.) highlights
the notion that price changes might have negative effects on customer-firm relationships.
These negative effects increase with the magnitude of the price change and the level of
economic activity.
The optimization problem of the intermediate goods producer is to maximize
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where tt
t Pλβ  is the marginal utility value to the representative household of an additional
dollar of profits during period t. The nominal profits )(itΠ  are defined as
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When maximizing the nominal profits intermediate goods producing firm has to take into
consideration the following constraint
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The first order conditions for this problem are:
( ) tttUtUtkt rzinikf λξ =− ),(),(1 , (20.)
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( )
[ ] 0)(
)(
1
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)(
)()(
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
11
=







−+



+


−−


−
+
+
+
+
−−
−−
−
iP
iP
y
iP
iP
E
P
y
P
iP
iP
y
iP
iP
P
y
P
iP
t
t
t
t
t
Ptt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
Pt
t
t
t
t
t
φλβ
θξφλθλ
θθ
(22.)
where tξ  is the Lagrange-multiplier of the constraint. Equation (20.) and (21.) equate the
marginal rate of substitution between labour and capital in production to the relative factor
price tt wr . Equation (22.) shows the optimal setting of the nominal price. In a symmetric
equilibrium, where tt PiP =)(  for all [ ]1,0∈i , equation (20.) and (21.) indicate that ttt µξλ ≡
denotes an gross markup of price over marginal cost. Equation (22.) then shows that in the
absence of the adjustment costs, when 0=Pφ , the markup will be equal to ( )1−θθ .
The monetary authority
The monetary authority supplies the economy with money. In every period t, the nominal
money supply grows with an exogenous rate tg , i.e. ( ) 11 −+= ttt MgM . The newly created
money is paid to the representative household as a lump-sum transfer. The nominal transfer
satisfies
1−−= ttt MMτ . (23.)
9Starting with the defintion of the growth rate of money, real balances ( ttt PMm ≡ ) can be
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where tg  is the growth rate of the nominal money supply, tπ  is the inflation rate. For the
analysis at hand we define ggtt −=ϖ  where "¯" denotes the steady state, i.e. tϖ  is the
deviation of the growth rate of money from its steady state. This deviation is formulated as a
stochastic process (see Walsh, 1998, p. 69) which can be described in logarithmic form as:
ϖ
ϖ εφϖψϖ ttztt z ++= −− 11 , (25.)
where 10 <≤ ϖψ  and ( )2,0...~ ϖϖ σε Ndiit .
It is assumed that the individual knows about the realisation of tϖ  and tz , when choosing its
optimal values of consumption, leisure, real balance and capital in period t.
Symmetric equilibrium
The symmetric equlibrium is defined as a set of allocations that satisfies the following
conditions:
? Taking prices as given, the representative household solves its optimization problem
? Taking all prices but his own as given, each intermediate goods producer solves the
optimization problem (17.)
? Taking all prices as given, the final goods allocation solves the final goods optimization
problem
? All markets clear, i. e.
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? The resource constraint for this economy holds
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Due to the symmetry of the model the price-level is ttt PjPiP == )()( .
The model contains the following eleven variables: yt , tc , tk , tI , tm , nt , tR , tµ , tπ , tz  and
tϖ .
Linear approximation
The focus of this paper is to examine whether two different forms of nominal rigidities
influence the dynamics of the model. A natural way to explore the dynamics is to use
simulated impulse response functions. In order to derive these impulse response functions it is
necessary to solve the model. To do so, one can either use numerical methods to solve the
nonlinear equations or, alternatively, approximate the model around its steady state and solve
the (log-) linearized version of the model. In what follows, the equations of the model have
been log-linearized around the steady state using the approximation technique of Uhlig
(1999). The model can be denoted in linearized form as
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The percentage deviation of a variable from its steady state value has been denoted as txˆ , i.e.
x
xx
x tt
−
=ˆ . Using the toolkit of Uhlig (1999) the model is solved for the recursive
equilibrium law of motion with the method of undetermined coefficients.
Calibration
The parameters of the models are common to the business cycle literature and most of the
parameters have been adopted from Ireland (1997) and Walsh (1998). The calibration is
consistent with the following scenario: the share of capital α  is 30%, the discount factor β is
chosen to guarantee a real interest rate of roughly 4% per year, the depreciation rate δ is 10%
per year. The steady state share of labour is about 30%, i.e. 30% of time is market activity, the
annual growth rate of the nominal money stock g  is 5%, the value of b is compatible with a
quotient of money to output of roughly 20%. θ  is equal to 6, so that the gross steady state
markup of price over marginal cost is 1.2. Being perhaps the parameter of most interest, Pφ , is
equal to 3.95, so that the costs of adjusting the nominal price is about 0.030% of aggregate
output.
12
In any case, simulation exercises indicate that the model is quite robust with regard to a
variation of the parameters. This is especially true for the persistence of the variables after a
monetary shock.3
The following table summerizes the parameters of the model
TABLE 1
BASELINE PARAMETER VALUES
α β δ η b Φ zψ ϖψ σ ϖσ
0.30 0.989 0.025 1 0.005 2.0 0.95 0.687 0.007 0.00216
zφ Θ θ Pφ
-0.15 1.0125 6 3.95
3 Monopolistic competition and staggered price-setting
In order to compare the staggered price setting mechanism and the adjustment cost
specification the model is formulated similar to the previous one. Only those equations will be
described explicitly which change due to the different nominal price inertia.
The specification of the household optimization problem and of the final goods producer
remain the same. There is still a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms that
produce differentiated products using capital and labour. These firms set nominal prices for a
fixed number of periods and do so in a staggered fashion. In particular, each period t, N1  of
these firms choose new prices, which are then fixed for N periods. The intermediate goods
producers are indexed so that producers indexed by [ ]Ni 1,0∈  set new prices in 0, N, 2N, and
so on, while producers indexed [ ]NNi 21 ,∈  set new prices in 1, N + 1, 2N + 1, and so on, for
the N cohorts of intermediate producers. In period t, each producer in a cohort chooses the
)(iPt  to maximize discounted profits from t to period t + N - 1 (see Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan,
2000, p. 1155).
                                                
3 Simulation exercises have shown that augmenting the adjustment cost does not increase the persistence of the
model, but increases the deviation from steady state.
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The optimization problem can be stated as follows.4 Each intermediate firm demands )(1 ik
U
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and )(inUt  in a way to minimize the cost of production, i.e. to minimize the unit cost. That is,
each firm solves the problem
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where tt Pλ  is the marginal utility value to the representative household of an additional
dollar of profits during period t. The nominal costs )(itΚ  are defined as
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The first order conditions are
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where tξ  is Lagrange-multiplier of the constraint. The first order conditions (45.) and (46.) are
exactly the same as in the previous model. As can be shown, tt λξ  can be interpreted as unit
cost (and therefore is the inverse of the markup variable of the previous model). The unit costs
will be denoted in the following as tυ .
In period t, each producer in a cohort chooses ist price )(iPt  to maximize discounted profits
from period t to period t + N - 1. Each intermediate goods producer solves the problem
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The solution to this problem is
                                                
4 One could, of course, state the problem completely analogous to the previous one.
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As already mentioned, implicit in equation (47.) are the demands for capital and labour of the
intermediate goods producer.
Due to the staggering mechanism, the price level can now be written as
[ ] θθθ −−+−− ++= 1111111 )()( iPiPP NtNtNt L (48.)
As the remaining structure of the model is identical to the structure of the previous sticky
price model we can skip the remaining details and go directly to the equlibrium of the model.
Symmetric equilibrium
The symmetric equlibrium is again defined by the decision rules of the representative
household and the decision rules of the firms. In each period t there is a vector of factor prices
that equates the supply of and the demand for labour and capital. There is a price vector
{ })(iPt , [ ]1,0∈i , that equates in every period t the market for intermediate goods. The price
vector { }tP  clears the market for finished goods. The resource constraint for this economy is
( ) .1 1 tttttt Ickkcy +=−−+= −δ (49.)
The model contains thirteen variables: yt , tc , tk , tI , tm , nt , tR , tµ , tπ , )(iPt , tP , tz  and
tϖ . In comparison to the previous sticky price model two additional variables, )(iPt and tP ,
have been introduced. To close the model we need one additional equation and introduce
therefore the definition of the inflation rate, i.e.
1
1
−
−
−
=
t
tt
t P
PP
π (50.)
Linear approximation
Again, the model is log-linearized around the steady state. For N = 2 and N = 4 the model can
be denoted as
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Calibration
The parameterization of the model is the same as in the prevoius model specification.
4 Transmission of a monetary shock
Adjustment costs
First, the monetary transmission mechanism of the first model is discussed where firms face
quadratic costs of adjustments (see Figure 1 to 5). Interestingly, the persistence of the model
does not increase, even when adjusment costs increase by a factor of 100 (see Figure 6 and 7).
Second, the dynamics of the staggered price model for N = 4 are presented, i.e. firms choose
their prices for one year (see Figure 8 to 12).
As the impulse-response-functions indicate, a 1% increase in the growth rate of the nominal
money supply leads to an increase in aggregate output of about 0.3%. This value is
considerably smaller than the simulation results in Hairault/Portier (1993) or Ireland (1997),
who report deviations of about 0.8-1.0% and 1.6%, respectively. At first glance this might be
puzzling, but can be explained by the fact that both Hairault/Portier (1993) and Ireland (1997)
use a slightly different definition of the growth rate of money. Both define the (gross) rate of
monetary growth as 1−= ttt MMg  whereas here the growth rate has been defined as
( ) 11 −−−= tttt MMMg . Using their definition of the growth rate of money, the simulation
results are similar in magnitude to Hairault/Portier (1993) (Ireland, 1997, does only report the
impulse response function for output). Consumption, investment, labour, the real interest rate
and inflation show a positive deviation from steady state, whereas the markup and the real
balances show negative deviations from their steady state values.
As can be seen from the dynamics of the real balances (Figure 1) the model does not exhibit a
textbook-style real-balance-effect that increases aggregate demand. Nevertheless, in the first
step, due to the monetary shock, the funds of the representative household increase, because
tτ  increases (by more than was expected the period before). Because of this wealth effect, the
demand for consumption goods and leisure increase as long as both goods are superior goods.
The increased demand for final good increases the demand of intermediate goods and
therefore the demand of labour and capital. Consequently, the real wage and the real interest
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rate increase, and therefore marginal costs increase, too. This puts an upward pressure on
prices, inflation and inflation expectations. Higher inflation, along with the associated
reduction in real balances, increases the marginal utility of consumption, reinforcing the
demand for consumption goods.5 However, as can be seen from the first order conditions (9)
and (10) (by inserting equation (9) in (10)) this is only compatible with an increase in labour
supply given the real wage. Therefore, the response of the labour supply is ambigious.6 As the
representative household attempts to smooth its consumption profile the demand of
investement goods (capital accumulation) increases, too.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 6 and 7, the persistence of output does not increase, even
when adjustment costs increase by a factor of 10 or 100, respectively. None of these impulse-
responses show the degree of persistence that has been reported in the VAR literature of the
monetary transmission mechanism.7
The impulse-responses reproduce one feature that has been emphasized in the New Keynesian
literature on real rigidities, see e.g. Ball/Romer (1990).8 Within this literature, it has been
argued that the effects of sticky prices, due to some cost of adjustment, are modest, at least if
one does not impose a very high level of adjustment costs. Nominal rigidities without real
rigidities do not account for a non-neutrality of money. The explanation is straightforward.
Although some impediments of price adjustment exists, prices are not sluggish, simply
because the incentives of the firms to adjust their prices are too strong. Not adjusting the
nominal price would be tantamount to a loss of profit. As long as this loss of profit is greater
than the costs of adjustments there is no price sluggishness to be expected. The impulse-
response-functions reproduce this insight in a dynamic context. The model does not exhibit
real rigidity.
Especially the impulse response-function of the markup indicates the immediate response of
the firms. Only one quarter after the monetary shock, the markup is back to its steady state
level, indicating that firms have an incentive to adjust prices immediately to a new profit
maximizing nominal price. Consequently, modest adjustment costs by themselves do not give
                                                
5 This is because of 1>Φ .
6 Note, an additional amplification mechanism is due to increased inflation expectations, as the monetery shock
exhibits serial correlation. However, this mechanism, which is crucial for the flex-price version of the model is
quantitatively small, see Walsh (1998, p. 73) for a description.
7 For instance, Christiano/Eichenbaum/Evans (1999) or Favero (2001).
8 Ball/Romer (1990, S. 186) offer the following definition: "We define a high degree of real rigidity as a ... small
responsiveness of an agent's desired real price to changes in aggregate real spending" Generally, two model
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rise to a new quantitative important propagation mechanism that augments the effects of the
monetary impulse and produces persistent effects. The endogenous markup adjusts very
quickly and therefore does not influence the dynamics of the model.9 Although an endogenous
markup by itself can be understood as an additional transmission mechanism (see e.g.
Rotemberg/Woodford, 1995, p. 244), the impulse response-functions illustrate that the
quantitative effect of this transmission channel is negligible.
The immediate adjustment of the firms and therefore the lack of persistence is also very
clearly illustrated by the adjustment of the inflation rate (see Figure 5). One period after the
shock inflation is back to its steady state level.
In the end two reasons account for the lack of persistence. Persistence is small because the
elasticity of substitution is constant ( θ− )10 and because the conditional factor demands
increase the marginal costs. The monetary shock is propagated by intra- and intertemporal
substitution mechanisms and not, as might be expected, by a positive real balance effect.
However, these substitution mechanisms are known to be weak (see Cogley/Nason, 1995).
Staggered price-setting
As in the previous specification, in the period of the monetary shock, consumption,
investment, labour, the real interest rate and inflation show a positive deviation from steady
state. Compatible with the negative deviation of the markup, unit cost increase whereas the
the real balances again show negative deviations, although to a lesser extent. The size of the
output deviation is bigger than in the previous specification. Again, none of these impulse-
response-functions show a degree of persistence comparable to the results reported in the
VAR literature. Interestingly, the adjustment back to steady state is different; most of the
variables return back by oscillating around the steady state. The impulse-response-functions,
illustrating a "negative endogenous persistence" (Bergin/Feenstra, 2000, p. 671), replicate the
analytical results of Bergin/Feenstra (2000), Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan (2000) and Kiley (1998).
The following interpretation is proposed: The expansionary shock increases output and the
conditional factor demands. As can be seen in Figure 13, due to the increased factor demands,
unit cost rises more than aggregate output. Because of the staggering, only the firms of the
                                                                                                                                                        
features can give rise to real rigidity: a small cyclical sensitivity of marginal cost or a large cyclical sensitivity of
marginal revenue. See e.g. Romer (1993).
9 The increase of both capital and labour demand increases the conditional factor demands and correspondingly
the marginal costs. Increasing marginal costs reduce the markup.
10 Therefore, prices are sensitive to changes in unit costs.
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first cohort are able to compensate the increase of unit cost by increasing their price )(ˆ ipt .
The firms of the other cohorts can only compensate the increased unit costs by reducing their
factor demands; lower labour demand and therefore lower employment results in lower
output. Whenever the firms of one cohort has an opportunity to adjust the price, the firms of
this cohort rise their prices accordingly. Thus, after firms of the last cohort had an opportunity
to adjust their prices (after four periods), output has fallen below steady state, and so has unit
cost. Firms of the first cohort will find it worth to expand their output again, since they can
compensate an increase of unit cost by adjusting their prices and the price adjustment process
starts again.11 However, these dynamics can hardly be reconciled with the empirical evidence.
Figure 1: Nominal rigidity due to adjustment costs
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11 For a similar reasoning, emphasizing the large increase of factor prices see Erceg (1997), Huang/Liu (1999) or
Koenig (1999). Similar dynamics of the aggregate output can be found in Bergin/Feenstra (2000) or Huang/Liu
(1999).
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Figure 2: Nominal rigidity due to adjustment costs
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Figure 3: Nominal rigidity due to adjustment costs
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Figure 4: Nominal rigidity due to adjustment costs
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Figure 5: Nominal rigidity due to adjustment costs
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Figure 6: costs of adjusting the nominal price is about 0.3 % of aggregate output
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Figure 7: costs of adjusting the nominal price is about 3.0 % of aggregate output
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Figure 8: Nominal rigidity due to staggered price-setting
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Figure 9: Nominal rigidity due to staggered price-setting
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Figure 10: Nominal rigidity due to staggered price-setting
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Figure 11: Nominal rigidity due to staggered price-setting
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Figure 12: Nominal rigidity due to staggered price-setting
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Figure 13: Nominal rigidity due to staggered price-setting
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5 Conclusion
Introducing small degrees of nominal rigidities in otherwise standard dynamic general
equilibrium models do not account for the observed persistence of output movements after a
monetary shock. The main reason seems to be, that firms have incentives to keep their
nominal prices close to the flex-price optimum. As emphasized in the New-Keynesian
literature on real rigidity and reinfored by Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan (2000), persistence is
absent in models, in which prices are sensitive to movements in marginal costs. A standard
dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities is not capable to generate output
persistence. However, qualitative differences between the dynamic effects of different forms
of rigidities can be observed.
Recent work has started to implement additional features that reduce the sensitivity of
marginal costs, such as real and nominal wage rigidity or variable capital utilization, see e.g.
Erceg (1997), Jeanne (1998) or Christiano/Eichenbaum/Evans (2001). An alternative avenue
is to implement features that reduce the price sensitivity to changes in marginal costs, such as
convex demand or specific factor-inputs, see e.g. Kimball (1995), Bergin/Feenstra (2000) or
Edge (2000).
Future work has to show whether the qualitative differences remain when dynamic general
equlibrium models are enriched with additional features that propose to augment the
persistence of the model.
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